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REPLY BRIEF

An examination of the authorities cited by respondent
reflect substantially those cases where a pedestrian steps suddenly into a busy highway without adequate observation as
to the conditions of traffic. This theory seems to be reflected
in most of the cases cited in respondents' brief. The theory
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is clearly stated in the case of DANDO vs. BROBST (Re
spondents' Brief, Page 31) where it is said:
"The accident occurred about one o'clock in tht
afternoon of a dry day, and it is not claimed tha
plaintiff's vision was in any way. ob~cured. Unde:
these circumstances, plaintiff muJt meVttably have see1
the car if she had looked, and if she saw nothing she
could not have been looking."
"The duty to look rests at all times upon everyone
in the use of streets * * * (citations omitted) * * :t
and when one steps into a busy street and is immedi
ately struck by a passing vehicle which he would hav1
seen had he looked, he is barred by his oU'n negligenc1
* * * (citations omitted) .
It is apparent that the question which divides counsel ir
their respective views is that appellant contends that the de
ceased Kartchner does not have the same duty to look foJ
approaching traffic as the pedestrian who moves from the
curb into a busy highway. Thirteenth South is not a bus)
highway in the sense of many highways where traffic is heavy
Plaintiff's evidence shows that there was very little traffic a
the time of the accident. It is a street where automobiles an
parked on each side of the highway beyond the traveled portior
of the road. A reference to Page 4 of appellants' brief wil
give the distances between the traveled portion of the highwaJ
and the south sidewalk. The hard surfaced portion of the
highway is approximately the north 40 feet in width anc
the distance from the north edge of the south sidewalk t<
the south edge of the traveled portion of the highway i:
eighteen feet. The deceased had a right to assume that wher
he was parked in this 18 foot area almost against the nortl
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edge of the south sidewalk that he was in a position of safety
insofar as alighting from his automobile. At all events, it
was not negligent for him to park his automobile where he
did park it and it was not negligent for him to leave his automobile from the left hand or north side. The only danger
to the deceased would be if some motor vehicle should leave
the main traveled part of the highway and come over into
the parking area. The deceased ought not to be charged
with negligence because he failed to see an automobile which
left the main traveled portion of the highway, came into the
parking area, and struck the deceased when he was alighting
from the station wagon approximately one foot north of the
left side. The respondent takes the position that the duty
of the deceased man was as great in leaving his automobile
as if the deceased when leaving it was immediately stepping
into the line of motor vehicle traffic. We submit that such
a duty of care ought not to be cast upon one who leaves his
automobile when it is parked a substantial distance away from
the portion of the highway and under circumstances where
the driver could not reasonably anticipate that a motor vehicle
would leave the traveled portion of the highway and move
into an area of safety, and it was not the deceased's duty to
anticipate the negligence of the defendant's truck driver.
We invite the court's attention to two additional cases,
KETCHUM v. PATTEE, (Cal.) 98 Pac. 2(d), 1051, and
STRICKLEN v. ROSEMEYER (Cal.), 142 Pac. 2d 953.
The Ketchum case is similar in its facts to the case at bar.
The plaintiff in that case ran out of gas while driving his automobile on the highway. He testified that he parked his auto-
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mobile in a posttlon on the west shoulder of the highway
with the edge of the left fenders and running board about
four inches west of the west lane of the pavement at which
point the traffic was light. The pavement was flanked on
each side by shoulders of oiled macadam material with a
dirt shoulder adjoining. He stepped out of his car to ascertain
if he was out of gas. He opened the left front door and
started to back out, and while his left foot was on the running
board and his right foot on the floor board was struck by an
on-coming truck. The Supreme Court in passing upon the
question of plaintiff's contributory negligence used the following language:
"Appellants next contend that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence because he left a place of
compartive safety and entered a place of peril when he
stepped out of the left door of his automobile without
taking precaution for his safety, and cite numerous cases
to sustain this point. However, most of these are cases
involving city street collisions between automobiles and
pedestrians in which the plaintiffs actually walked or
ran in front of oncoming vehicles without first looking.
The case at bar presents a different factual situation.
While here is conflicting proof, it is this court's
duty to view the evidence 'in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs, and to see if there is any substantial
evidence which would take the case to the jury on the
question of contributory negligence.' Rivera v. Hasenjaeger, 29 Cal. App. 2d 431, 432, 85 P. 2d 167. The jury
may have believed from the evidence that plaintiff was
not negligent in stopping his automobile on the shoulder of the highway, and that he was not yet out of the
car when the collision occurred, but was partly in the
car and partly on the running board. There are authorities which hold that it is not negligence per se to ride
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on a running board. Strong v. Olsen, 74 Cal. App. 518,
519, 241 P. 107; Yates v. J. H. Krumlinde & Co., 22 Cal.
App. 2d 387, 391, 71 P. 2d 298. Again, the jury may
have believed from the photgraph in evidence showing
the bent brace on the front of the tniCk body, which is
in some distance from the right front corner of the
truck bed, that the truck was traveling exceedingly close
to the parked car and that a reasonable person, situated
as plaintiff was, would not have anticipated that any
vehicle would pass close enough to collide with him
under the circumstances, in view of the proof to the
effect that there was no north-bound traffic and that
defendant had. approximately 30 feet of paved highway
and an additional 7 feet of oiled shoulder east of
piaintiff's parked car on which to pass. Under the
circwnstances existing in this case the issue of whether
or not plaintiff was negligent in stopping his car
where he did stop it, or in starting to alight from it
after it was parked, we think, was an issue of fact on
which reasonable men might differ."
The principle of law for which the appellant contends,
we think is well stated in the Stricklen case. In that case
the plaintiff parked his automobile near the curb in front of
his home with the left side of the vehicle facing the street.
While the car was in this position, he opened the left front
door, put his feet on the running board, and with his head
and shoulders protruding, looked to the rear and saw a passenger bus approaching which was operated by defendants.
At that time the bus was only 12 to 20 feet to the rear of
plaintiff's car and traveling about 15 miles per hour. In this
situation the plaitniff threw the door of his car farther open and
prepared to alight. The rear door of the bus had been left
open while the driver was collecting a fare and the door of
the bus struck the door of plaintiff's car, injuring the plaintiff.
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The court gave an instruction that where a person has
a choice of two ways of performing an act, one of which is
safe and the other of which he knows ot' in the exercise of
reasonable care should know is subject to danger, and that
when such person chooses the dangerous way of performing
the act and as a direct proximate result thereof is injur~,
such person is guilty of contributory negligence and is not
entitled to recover damages from another on account of his
injuries so received.
The court further instructed the jury:
·'The plaintiff, Charles Stricklen, is not to be charged
with negligence merely because he alighted by the
northerly door of his automobile. I instruct you that
the standard of care required of the plaintiff in this
action is ordinary care as defined in these instructions.
It is the care an ordinary person of ordinary prudence
would use under all of the circumstances of the situation, and if you find that the plaintiff did use ordinary
care in alighting from his automobile, I instruct you
that the plaintiff had a right to alight therefrom by
the northerly door."
The court in construing these instructions says that the
:first instruction above set forth was but a generalization of
a well settled rule, and that its application to the facts of the
case was carefully tied in by the admonition that the use of
the left front door was not in itself negligence but that the
plaintiff "had a right to alight therefrom" and could be charged
with negligence by reason of the act only if the jury found
that he had not used "ordinary care as defined in these instructions."
8
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The case at bar is much stronger in its application to the
foregoing rule than the Stricklen case because in the Stricklen
case it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff did know
the proximity of the bus to his automobile when he alighted
therefrom and the instruction itself places the application of
the safe course rule to situations where the person against
whom the rule is sought to be enforced knew of the danger
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of
the danger.
The facts, circumstances, and legal consequences which
are indicated in the Savas case (Appellants' Brief, Page 20-21)
seem reasonably· applicable to the case at bar. The deceased
Kartchner, as in the Savas case, was in a position in the parking
area where he had a right to be and should have been; at said
time all the remainder of the road lying north of where the
deceased parked and left his car was open to the defendants
and if the driver of defendants' truck had looked ahead as
was his duty to do, there was nothing to prevent his seeing
the deceased and his automobile in time to avoid the collision,
and it was, as said in the Savas case, his duty to so look ahead
in the exercise of reasonable care. The law presumes under
the circumstances in this case that the deceased was in the
exercise of due care, and the burden was on the defendants
to rebut this presumption.
Again the language in the Reagan case (Appellants'
Brief, page 21-22) also seems clearly applicable in the facts
to the case at bar. There the court said that if there was a
plainly visible obstruction in the street, a person taking position
on or immediately in front of it, would be in a position of
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safety and might be relieved from the duty of observing
traffic as he would be if he remained on the sidewalk. The
standing ·automobile was a clearly visible obstruction in the
course of the on-coming truck.
Respectfully submitted,

JOE P. BOSONE
A.H.HOUGAARD
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